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Abstract 
This paper studies the problem of designing efficient trading mechanisms when 
players may engage in pre-play communication. It is well known that 
equilibrium behavior can be affected, sometimes drastically, if players have 
the opportunity to exchange messages prior to playing some particular game. 
We investigate the relationship between efficiency, pre-play communication, 
and unique implementation. We identify a class of simple mechanisms which are 
immune to pre-play communication and show that any incentive efficient 
allocation can be uniquely implemented by such a mechanism . 
1. Introduction
This paper studies the problem of designing efficient trading mechanisms 
when players may engage in pre-play communication. It is by now well known 
that equilibrium behavior can be affected, sometimes drastically, if players 
have the opportunity to exchange messages prior to playing some particular 
game (Crawford and Sobel [1982]). Applications of this basic insight include 
bilateral bargaining (Farrell and Gibbons [ 1988] , Matthews and Postlewaite 
[1988]), adoption of new technology (Farrell and Saloner [1987]), presidential 
veto threats (Matthews [1987]) polls and straw votes (Ordeshook and Palfrey 
[1988]), and voluntary public good provision (Palfrey and Rosenthal [1988]). 
A central finding has been that communication can enlarge the set of 
equilibria relative to the game with no communication, but cannot reduce the 
set of equilibria. The above papers identify economically interesting aspects 
of the comparison between these two sets equilibria in specific settings . 
From the standpoint of mechanism design theory, this effect of 
communication raises important issues. On one hand, the expansion of 
equilibria is very encouraging, since outcomes which were generated in 
equilibrium without communication can still be achieved, and, in addition, it 
may be possible to achieve even more desirable outcomes than those possible 
without communication. This suggests that the implementation of optimal 
allocations may be possible using relatively 11 simple11 trading games which are 
preceded by pre-play communication. On the other hand, the results suggest 
that communication may lead to the possibility of undesirable equilibrium 
outcomes which were not possible without communication. Thus, while 
communication may introduce better equilibrium outcomes, it may worsen the 
(full) implementation problem. 
In our view, it is often reasonable to suppose that traders can engage in 
non-binding communication. Consequently, if we aim to analyze the outcomes 
that can be attained by some institution, it may be very important for the set 
of outcomes of the institution to be robust to such communication. In this 
paper, we propose one way of resolving this problem in a wide class of models. 
We show that there is a close relationship between efficiency, Dre-nlPiv ... �- -�.; 
communication, and unique (or full) implementation. Our main result is that 
it is possible to design simple trading mechanisms which yield interim 
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efficient utility allocations as unique equilibrium outcomes with and without 
pre-play conununication. 
One of the best known models to which our 
non-cooperative bargaining. The bargaining 
results 
problem 
apply is that of 
with incomplete 
information has been extensively studied in the literature, and two approaches 
can be distinguished : the mechanism design approach, and the institutional
approach. The mechanism design approach seeks to characterize all possible 
bargaining outcomes which can arise from trading mechanisms . The 
institutional approach, on the other hand, characterizes the outcomes to 
particular trading schemes. The k-double auction has played a central role in 
this development as have various sequential trading mechanisms. 
A major contribution of the mechanism design literature has been the 
characterization of efficient bargaining outcomes. 
[ 1983] and Williams [ 1987] characterize ex-ante 
Myerson and Satterthwaite 
efficient outcomes to the 
bargaining problem. Wilson [ 1985] and Satterthwaite and Williams [ 1987] 
provide a characterization of interim efficient outcomes. 
In light of these results, a question of considerable interest is whether 
some intuitive and "reasonable11 trading mechanisms yield efficient outcomes. 
Myerson and Satterthwaite [ 1983] showed that the equilibrium analyzed by 
Chatterjee and Samuelson [ 1983] in the split the difference double auction 
with uniform distributions was ex-ante efficient. Satterthwaite and Williams 
[1987] demonstrate that for an open set of parameters, the k-double auction 
has an ex-ante efficient equilibrium. 
auctions generally have a continuum 
However, it is also known that double 
of inefficient equilibria (Leininger, 
Linhart and Radner [1986] i Satterth1:vaite and �Villiains [1987]). 
In a recent paper, Matthews and Postlewaite [1987] examine the 
consequences of allowing unmediated pre-play communication, or 11cheap talk," 
in k-double auctions . They show that adding this feature to the model has 
dramatic consequences for the set of equilibria. First, by allowing traders to 
correlate their strategies in ways impossible without comnununication, they 
show that communication dramatically expands the set of equilibriaso that, 
among others, efficient allocations are equilibrium outcomes. Second, they 
show that the set of equilibrium outcomes with cheap-talk is independent of 
the parameter k .  We are able to show that this bargaining game with 
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communication can be altered slightly to produce efficient and (essentially) 
unique outcomes. 
The general topic of this paper, then, is efficient mechanism design with 
pre-play communication. While much of our analysis is motivated by the double 
auction, our results extend to any setting with private values, independent 
types, and a divisible good. In this class of models, we first show that any 
interim efficient utility allocation can be made the unique outcome to a 
mechanism even if pre-play communication is allowed. In other words, such 
payoffs can be fully implemented in a cheap-talk proof manner. The mechanism 
we construct in the proof is a very simple augmentation of a direct mechanism. 
Second, we examine the set of equilibria which can be attained by allowing 
communication in arbitrary given trading mechanisms (such as the double 
auction). Here, too, we obtain a positive result on the set of utility 
allocations which can be attained by the mechanism with pre-play 
communication. We show that any utility allocation which is interim efficient 
relative to this set can be fully implemented in a cheap talk proof manner by 
a very simple augmentation of the underlying mechanism. 
result in the context of the double auction. 
We illustrate this 
Because we are identifying allocations that can be uniquely implemented, 
our results are clearly related to those in the literature on full Bayesian 
implementation (see Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986], Palfrey and Srivastava 
[1985], Mookherjee and Reichelstein [1987], Jackson [1987]). This literature 
has identified very general conditions under which an incentive compatible 
allocation can be made the unique Bayesian equilibrium outcome to a mechanism . 
Our results show that in the class of models examined in this paper, interim 
efficient allocations always satisfy these conditions in the sense that the 
interim utility of any such allocation can be made the unique equilibrium 
outcome to a mechanism. The two essential differences between the full 
implementation approach and that followed here are that first, we require 
uniqueness in utility rather that in outcomes, and second, we require immunity 
to pre-play communication . 
In the next Section, we discuss the problems of multiple equilibria and 
pre-play communication in the specific context of the k-double auction. The 
model analyzed in the paper is presented in Section 3. In Sec ti on 4, we 
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analyze the possibility of implementing interim efficient allocations without 
communication, while our main results on mechanism design with pre-play 
communication are contained in Section 5. Extensions of our results and a 
discussion of the relationship between the results presented here and the 
literature on full implementation are contained in Section 6 .  
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2. Example Double Auctions
Consider the following bargaining problem between a seller and a buyer. 
The seller has one unit of a good which he may sell to the buyer. The 
valuation of the seller is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on 
[0,1], and that of the buyer is also drawn independently from a uniform 
distribution on [0,1]. Let v denote the valuation of the seller, v that of 
s b 
the buyer, and let y be the payment made by the buyer to the seller . The 
problem is to decide when to trade, and the payment the seller should receive. 
One institution which could be used by the parties is the k-double
auction. The rules of the game are as follows : both players simultaneously 
submit bids, say b and s for the buyer and seller respectively. If b ;>: s, 
then the good is awarded to the buyer and the seller receives a monetary 
transfer y � ks+(l-k)b. No trade takes place and no money changes hands if b 
is less than s. Let b (v ) be the strategy of the buyer, s (v ) that of the 
b s 
seller. 
This simple double auction has a plethora of equilibria. Chatterjee and 
Samuelson [1983] show that the following strategies form a Bayesian 
equilibrium when k � 1/2 : 
b (v ) 
b 
s (v ) 
s 
(1/12) + (2/3)v b 
(1/4) + (2/3) v . 
s 
Thus, trade takes place if v ;>: (1/4) + v ,  and the payment made by the buyer b s 
is (1/6) + (l/3)(v +v ). 
b s 
As shown by Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983], this 
allocation is ex-ante efficient (in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson [1981] )  
since it maximizes the expected gains from trade among all incentive 
compatible, individually rational mechanisms. 
Leininger, Linhart, and Radner [1986] show that there is another family 
of equilibria in which the traders employ step functions as strategies . 
Included in this family are single-price equilibria, defined as follows. For 
a fixed z E [0,1], define 
b (v ) 
b 
{ z if v "= z 
1 othe;wise
if v " z 
s(v ) 
s otherwise 
For any z E [ 0, l] , these strategies form a Bayesian equilibrium. 
5 
More 
generally, there also exist multiple price equilibria in which bidding 
strategies are step functions. These equilibria are generally not efficient 
although there is experimental evidence that they may well arise in the actual 
play of the double auction (see Radner and Schotter [1986]). 
Satterthwaite and Williams [1987] show that if k E (0,1), then there is 
also a continuum of differentiable equilibrium strategies, which are 
also typically inefficient (in various senses). These diverse equilibria 
produce different allocations and different interim utilities. 
Finally, Matthews and Postlewaite [1988] have shown that there are yet 
many more equilibria if we allow for the possibility of non-binding pre-play 
communication. In fact, these communication equilibria are independent of the 
parameter k in the k-double auction. As an example of their construction, 
consider the 0-double auction, which is the 11 buyers-bid11 auction. Without 
communication, this auction has a unique equilibrium in undominated 
strategies. The equilibrium outcome is interim efficient and, from the point 
of view of the seller, is the best possible incentive compatible, individually 
rational allocation (Riley and Zeckhauser [1983]). The following strategies 
constitute a (sequential) equilibrium to the game with communication : the 
buyer sends the message z, where z maximizes (v -z)F(z), where the prior 
b 
distribution over v is F. In the actual play of the double auction, both 
s 
players follow the single price equilibrium strategy with respect to z. The 
outcome here is best for the buyer even though the game being studied is 
supposed to be the best for the seller. 
This paper attempts to address the following issues, raised by the 
variety of problems described above : 
(1) Can an interim efficient outcome be made the unique equilibrium to a game? 
(2) When can such outcomes be made cheap- talk proof so that uniqueness is not 
undermined by pre-play communication ? 
(3) If a particular game has an more than one outcome, can the game be 
augmented slightly to select a particular equilibrium outcome ? 
(4) When can this be done in a cheap-talk proof manner ? 
Questions 1 and 3 are analyzed in Section 4, while questions 2 and 4 are 
studied in Section 5. 
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3. The Model
There are I agents, indexed by i, and a set A of alternatives. We assume 
that A is a metric space. Ti denotes the set of possible types for agent i,
and Fi (t ) -i 
denotes the distribution function on -i T . Note that we are 
assuming independent types. 
Given i a type t., an alternative a E A, and a real number y ,  the utility1 
of agent i is given by Ui(a,yi, t_ ), where yi is a monetary transfer to agent
1 
i, and can be positive or negative . We assume that utility is strictly 
increasing in the transfer, that Ui is measurable with respect to the Borel
sigma-algebra on AxR, and that for any compact subset of AxR, the range of Ui
lies in a compact subset of the real line, R. The specification of the utility 
function contains the assumption of private values in that the utility 
function of i does not depend on t We discuss more general (common value)-i 
specifications in Section 6 .  Let P(AxR1) denote the set of all probability
measures on the Borel sets of AxR1.
Definition l.;_ An allocation rule is
of AxR1 
a function p T -> P(AxR1) such that
there exists a compact subset containing the support of p(t) for all 
t. 
By assuming that Ui measurable and bounded on compact sets and that the
supports of all measures in the range of p lies in the same compact set, we 
ensure that we do not encounter any integrability problems when defining 
expected utility . 
alternative a and 
We 
the 
interpret 
transfers 
p(a, y,t) as 
1 I y� (y , . .. ,y ). 
the joint probability 
The reader may wish 
of 
to 
restrict p so that the transfers always swn to zero; however, assurnirng that 
allocations are 11balanced11 in this way is not needed for any of our results. 
We will denote by pi(t) the marginal distribution on A and the i'th copy of R.
Many problems of interest are covered by this model, and many of the 
models used to study 
is the special case 
following. 
them employ the assumption of transferable utility, which 
i i i in which U (a,y, t .) U (a, t.) + y .  These include the 
1 1 
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Example 1: Auctions 
Suppose a seller wishes to auction an object, and there are I buyers. Let t i 
denote the value of the object to buyer i. Let a denote the alternative 11 the 0 
seller keeps the object", and a 
j 
the alternative "buyer j gets the object". 
Then, p (a,,t) 
J 
is the probability that j gets the object, is the 
payment made by buyer j. If all the agents are risk neutral, this corresponds 
to a special case of the model in Myerson [1981]. Maskin and Riley [1986] and 
others have examined optimal auctions when buyers are risk averse. 
Example £: Bilateral Bargaining 
This is the problem discussed in Section 2. Let a 1 denote the alternative
"the seller keeps the object1 1 and let a be the alternative 1 1 the buyer2 
receives the 
and T2 those 
object". Let T1 be the set of possible valuations for the seller
1 2 for the buyer, and let y (t) � - y (t) be the payment received by
the seller. This is the model of Chatterjee and Samuelson [1981], Myerson and 
Satterthwaite [1983], and also studied by Leininger, Linhart, and Radner 
[1986] and Satterthwaite and Williams [1987]. 
Example l: Public Goods 
Let a denote the alternative "the public 1 
alternative "the public good is not built1 1 •  
good 
Let t i 
is built11 and
denote the value 
a 2
of 
the 
the 
public good to agent i, and interpret the monetary transfers to be taxes paid 
by the agents . The public good costs c to produce. Efficiency requires 
production if and only if the sum of the individual valuations exceeds c. The 
design problerr1 is to cor1struct a rule for making balanced side payments so 
that efficient production is achieved in equilibrium. This is the public goods 
allocation problem studied by D'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [1979], Laffont and 
Maskin [1982], Mailath and Postlewaite [1988], and others. 
Example �: Oligopoly 
There are I firms producing a homogeneous good with (different) constant 
average costs of production. The cost to firm i of producing q, units is 
i 
Given a vector of outputs Q = (n _ . . .  , q1) ;  indt1stry revenue is B�(Q).' -il ' 
Efficiency requires only the lowest cost firm to produce all the output. The 
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alternatives are vectors of output, a (q1, ... ,q1), utility is given byi i U (a, t.) � -t_q., and the transfers, y , sum to R (Q) in a balanced mechanism. 1 1 1 
This problem was originally studied by Roberts [1983, 1985] ,  and has been 
explored further by Cramton and Palfrey [1987] and Kihlstrom and Vives [1987]. 
Example 2: Dissolving a Partnership 
Several individuals own shares of an asset they value differently. Each 
partner' s (constant) marginal valuation of the asset is t . The asseti 
valuations are private information, and the design problem is to find a set of 
balanced transfers which enable efficient dissolution. Efficiency requires 
the partner with the highest valuation to own all the shares. Here, an 
alternative a 
distribution of 
(al, ... 'Cl!I) 
shares, and 
with "' i i U (a,ti) 
Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer [1987]. 
� 0 and � "' 1 i 
t "' This model i i 
specifies the
is studied by 
As is well known, the set of allocation rules which can be made 
equilibrium outcomes to games are restricted by incentive compatibility 
conditions. We develop these next. For any r E Ti, leti 
i V (p,t ,r. )1 1 
Definition .2. :  An allocation rule p is incentive compatible if for all i and 
t i 
i We will write V (p, t . ,  t.) -
1 1 
for all r E Ti . i 
i v (p,t.). 
1 
In the analysis that follows, we do not address problems of individual 
rationality. However, our results also apply if allocations are constrained 
by individual rationality constraints as well as by the usual incentive 
constraints. 
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Definition l :  A reduced form allocation rule, P ,  is a collection of functions 
p � (P1, ... ,P1), with P': T' � P(AxR).
A reduced form allocation rule, P, can be constructed from an allocation rule, 
p, by defining 
dF' (t .) for all measurable sets B � A, C � R .
- 1  
:�;::t i)t �isJ ed�:�y:�:i)f::;d:�::,, t.).1 1 1 
AxR 
The assumptions of private values and independence have the following 
consequence which is central to our analysis. Suppose that agent i is faced 
with the choice of reporting an element of T'. If the agent reports r. ,
1 
outcome a is chosen and the agent receives a transfer y1 with probability
i i P (a,y ,r.). Then, incentive compatibility implies that when faced with these
1 
:�;:��ie'sr,,) a:eJt d:i ;:�:, ,t:,�:�:::�:y:�:�;�
AxR 
10 
t . 
i 
This follows from the fact that
Mechanisms and equilibrium 
A mechanism is µ �  (M,g), where M � M1 x M2 x x M1, and g is a
function g M � P(AxR1), again satisfying the condition that there is a
compact subset of Ax R1 containing the support of g(m) for all m E M. The set
Mi is the message space of agent i, and g is called the outcome function. For
each m E M,
distribution 
distribution 
I g (m) yields a probability measure on AxR , specifying the joint 
of alternatives and transfers. We denote by gi(m) the marginal
on A and the i'th component of R
1.
Definition�: A strategy for i is a function ai: Ti � Mi. 
Given a strategy profile a 
type t is given by 
i 
1 I (a , . . .  ,a ) , the interim utility to i when of
Definition 2: a is a Bayesian equilibrium if for i and t ,i 
We are now in a position to define what we mean by implementation in 
utility. 
Definition .§.: An allocation rule p is essentially implementable if there
exists a mechanism (M, g), with at least one Bayesian equilibrium, such that 
for every Bayesian equilibrium, a, 
Vi(p, t .)  Wi(a, t.) 1 1 
for all i and t., 1 
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4. Efficient and Unique Implementation without Communication
The main focus of this paper is on interim efficient allocation rules 
(see Holmstrom and Myerson [1983]). One of the central unanswered questions 
in mechanism design theory is the relationship between efficient allocations 
and fully implementable allocations. The motivation behind much of recent 
work on fully implementation is that many many incentive compatible 
allocations may not be uniquely achievable by any mechanism . This can happen 
if they fail to satisfy a condition called Bayesian monotonicity (Postlewaite 
and Schmeidler [1986], Palfrey and Srivastava [1989]). In this Section, we 
show that this is not a problem in the class of environments described in 
Section 3. Indeed, we show here that there is a close connection between 
interim efficiency and full implementability. 
are defined as follows. 
Interim efficient allocations 
Definition l: p is interim efficient if p is incentive compatible and there
does not exist another incentive compatible allocation rule, say q, such that 
i i V (q, t .)  2: V (p, t.) for all i and t and with strict inequality for at least 1 1 i 
one i and t .i 
The next result shows that any interim efficient allocation rule is 
essentially implementable. The proof relies heavily on the reduced form being 
incentive compatible. 
Theorem 1 :  Let p be interim efficient. Then, it is essentially 
implementable. 
Proof : A proof is given in the Appendix. Here, we provide a particularly 
simple proof for the case of transferable utility, i.e. when the utility 
i i function takes the form U (a, t ) + y .i 
corresponding to p, 
Consider the reduced form allocations 
dFi(t , ), the marginal distribution on A,
-i 
12 
and I I I 
-i
/pi(da,dyi• \•t_i)dF
i(t_i
), the expected transfer.
R A T 
Then, it is easily verified that 
i v (p,t_ ) 
' 
i V (p,t. ,r. ) 
' ' 
I i i U (a,t.)P (da,t.) 
' ' 
A 
+ Yi(t_), and that
' 
L i i U (a, t. )P (da, r. ) i + y ( r . ) . ' ' ' 
Incentive compatibility implies that "truth" is an equilibrium in the direct 
mechanism, where Mi = 
message space of i is 
i T and g � p. Consider the indirect game in which the
i T x [0,1]. The outcomes are modified as follows :
(1) If, for each i, (t_ , 0) is reported, the outcome is as under the direct' 
mechanism, i. e. p (t). 
(2) If all agents other than i report a zero in the second component of their 
message space 
according to 
while i reports ( r. , e) with e > 0, then the outcome is chosen' 
the distribution Pi(r.), i receives the transfer i y ( r. ) ' and
' ' 
every j r' i receives the transfer i -[Y ( r. ) t]/(I-1). Thus, if i alone 
' 
deviates from reporting a zero, he receives the reduced form gamble of his 
reported type but receives a lower (by < ) transfer. 
divided equally among the other agents. 
The transfer to i is
(3) If more than one agent reports a strictly positive number, then the agent 
reporting the lowest positive number plays the role of i above. If there is a 
tie, then the agent with the lowest index and the lowest number plays the role 
of i above. 
Now, observe that honestly reporting your type and reporting zero is a 
Bayesian equilibrium, by the fact that the reduced form gambles are incentive 
compatible. Furthermore, note that all equilibria involve reporting zero, 
since it always pays to reduce your positive number. Finally, if there is 
another equilibrium, it must yield everyone at least as great an interim 
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payoff as p at every type, since otherwise some type of some agent would be 
worse off and should ask to play his original gamble and pay slightly more 
than in the original gamble, i.e. report (t. , €) . 
' 
Since the original
allocation is interim efficient, all equilibrium utility allocations yield 
this efficient interim payoff to all agents. 
The proof for the more general class of models considered in this paper 
contains exactly the same intuition as the case of transferable utility. 
Since this is notationally more cumbersome, we provide the proof in the 
Appendix. 111111 
The augmentation we have performed essentially converts the direct 
mechanism into a 11unanimity" game : any agent has the right to veto a proposed 
equilibrium outcome and revert to his reduced form gamble by paying € .  The 
power of this result can be illustrated by considering in detail the bilateral 
trading problem discussed in Section 2 .  The Chatterjee-Samuelson equilibrium 
in the split the difference double auction with uniform distributions produces 
the following (deterministic) allocation rule: 
y (v , v )b ' 
if v � (1/4) + v b '
otherwise { (1/6) + (1/2) (vb+v,J
0 
if v � (1/4) + v b '
otherwise 
One can interpret this allocation rule, p (q,y), simply as a direct 
mechanism in which truth telling is an equilibrium. The interesting property 
of this allocation rule is that it is ex-ante efficient, and thus interim 
efficient. However, there are many inefficient equilibria to the direct 
mechanism defined by p. One of these is the following, which yields the same 
outcomes as the single price equilibrium in the k-double auction with z � 1/2 : 
fJ (v ) 
b 
if v � 1/2b 
otherwise a (v )s 
14 
if v :,,; 1/2 
otherwise 
One can easily see that this is not an equilibrium to the mechanism 
constructed in the proof of Theorem 1, since the buyer would deviate by 
reporting a small < > 0 for a wide range of types. For
3/8, the buyer receives interim utility of 0 in the single
instance, if v = 
b 
price equilibrium 
1/ B 
and f [3/80 (1/2) [3/8 + v ]  dv s s > 0 in the Chatterjee-Samuelson
equilibrium. It is easily verified that any < < 13/768 improves the payoff to 
the buyer of type v � 3/8 and thus breaks the single price equilibrium. b 
15 
Efficiency Relative to g Mechanism 
Theorem 1 shows that in the class of models described in Section 3, a 
simple augmentation of a direct mechanism essentially implements any interim 
efficient allocation rule . In this Section, we ask whether or not a given 
trading mechanism can be augmented so as to eliminate 11undesirable 11 
equilibria. By undesirable we mean any equilibrium which is Pareto dominated 
by another equilibrium . 
Pareto-ranked equilibria. 
It is well known that many games have multiple, 
What we are suggesting here is that very simple 
institutional features may allow us to focus on the preferred equilibria. To 
motivate this analysis, consider the k-double auction . As discussed in 
Section 2, Satterthwaite and Williams [1987] and Leininger, Linhart and 
Radner [ 1986] have shown that these auctions have large multiplicities of 
equilibria, most of them inefficient . These results raise the following 
question : if we view the k-double auction as a reasonable trading mechanism, 
is there a simple modification of the auction which retains much of the 
simplicity of the original mechanism but eliminates all outcomes which are 
inefficient relative to those attainable by a k-double auction ? 
answer this question affirmatively. 
We now 
Let µ be a mechanism, and let E denote the set of equilibria to µ. µ 
Then, a E E µ is an interim efficient equilibrium of µ if there does not exist
a' E E µ such that W
i(a' , t .)
i 
i e: W (a, t.) for all i and t. with strict inequality
i i 
for at least one i and t . 
i 
Definition� : µ' � (M' ,g') is an augmentation ofµ 
sets Ni, i=l,2, .. ,I such that
(i) M'i � Mi xNi, so M' �M x N  
(M, g) if there exist
(ii) there exists n EN such that g'(m,n) g(m) for all m E M.
This definition is written differently but is equivalent to that given by 
Mookherjee and Reichelstein [1987]. 
Theorem .f.: If a is interim efficient equilibriwn of µ, then there exists an
augmentation of µ, say µ', such that every equilibriwn of µ' yields interim 
16 
utility equal to that from a.
Proof: A proof is given in the Appendix. Here, we again consider the very 
simple case of transferable utility. 
Let a be an interim efficient equilibrium of µ� (M,g). We construct µ' from 
µ along the lines of the construction in Theorem 1. Let the message space of 
each i be Mi x [0,1]. The outcomes are specified as follows.
(1) If no agent reports a positive number, then the outcome is the same as 
that given by g. 
(2) If only one agent, say i, reports (mi,e) with e > 0, then the outcome is
chosen according to the distribution Pi(mi), and agent i receives a transfer
i i i Y (m )-e , where 
and 
i i Every j � i receives the transfer -[Y (m )-e]/(I-1).
(3) If more than one agent reports a positive number, then the agent with the 
lowest number plays the role of i above; again, ties are broken by choosing 
the agent with the lowest index. 
Since a is an equilibrium to (M,g), the argument employed in Theorem 1 implies 
that (a, 0) is an equilibrium to the augmented mechanism. It is similarly 
shown that all equilibria to the augmented mechanism must yield interim 
utility equal to that from a . ••• 
It is easy to see ho-v.r the augmentation eliminates single price equilibria 
in the k-double auction. Consider, for example, such an equilibrium 
17 
corresponding to z � 1/2. Then, if values are uniformly distributed between 0 
and 1, the expected payoff to the buyer in this equilibrium is (l/2) (v - 1/2) b 
if v � 1/2 and zero otherwise, while the expected payoff 
b 
equilibrium identified by Chatterjee and Samuelson [1983] is 
in the efficient 
(l/2)(v - 1/4) 2 ifb 
v � 1/4 and zero otherwise. Thus, the buyer should deviate from the single 
b 
price strategy if v E (l/4,3/4).
b 
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6 .  Implementation with pre-play communication 
This section investigates implementation when players may communicate 
with each other prior to playing the game. It is by now well-known that the 
possibility of unmediated communication, or cheap talk (Farrell [1988]), 
generally produces abundant equilibria, since it allows players to use 
communication to transmit information and/or correlate their strategies in 
ways that were not available when the original form of the mechanism did not 
include these early 11payoff irrelevant 11 stages. This explosion of equilibria 
presents interesting and important problems from the standpoint of mechanism 
design (Farrell [1983]). On the positive side, it suggests that "good" 
equilibria may emerge from 11intuitive11 mechanisms which are augmented by early 
rounds of cheap talk among players. This possibility is indeed encouraging, as 
one of the common criticism of the usefulness of mechanism design theory has 
been that the implementing mechanisms produced by current theoretical tools 
are often complicated and impractical. Consideration of very simple 
mechanisms combined with urunediated communication therefore seems like a 
promising direction to pursue in search of 11 realistic11 mechanism design. On 
the other hand, if the resulting good equilibrium is only one of many, then the 
usual 11 full implementation11 criticisms apply. (See Postlewaite and Matthews 
[1987] for a more detailed statement of the issues raised by this difficulty). 
This multiplicity problem is further compounded by the fact that often none of 
the standard refinement techniques succeed in eliminating unwanted equilibria. 
(See Farrell [1988] and Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite [1988] for 
extensive discussions of 
equilibrium refinements). 
the relationship between communication and 
This section addresses this multiplicity problem and proposes a potential 
solution. Suppose that there is a direct mechanism, µ, to be played, and 
suppose that there is an equilibrium a that produces an interim efficient 
allocation p .  Further suppose that the players cannot be prevented from 
communicating prior to playing µ. The question we pose is under what 
conditions can µ be augmented to µ' so that p is a unique equilibrium 
outcome ofµ' and no (finite) amount of cheap-talk can undermine p, in the 
sense of introducing extraneous, unwanted equilibrium outcomes to µ' ? 
19 
The answer we provide is very encouraging, and is closely related to the 
analysis in the previous section. There we constructed a class of 
augmentations to uniquely implement the interim utility of p whenever p is 
interim efficient. 
cheap-talk proof. 
In this section we show that this augmentation is 
In order to state this result precisely, we need to 
introduce some formal definitions. 
Let µ (M, g) be any mechanism. We wish to consider a class of 
augmentations of µ that involve a type of communication related to (but not as 
general as) Forges' (1988) "communication devices" and Myerson' s (1986)
"communication mechanisms. 11 These mechanisms are K+2 stage games. In the 
first stage (stage 0), nature moves and privately assigns all players their 
types according to some known distribution. No player has a move at this time 
and all players privately observe their own type. At stage k, 1 � k � K, all 
players simultaneously and publicly broadcast messages, say m� E M� , and then
receive the messages sent by all other players. For simplicity the set of 
allowed messages for each player, M�, is assumed not to depend on the past
messages sent by all the players . Finally, in stage K+l, µ is played out and 
an allocation is determined according to g. Note that the outcome function 
depends only on the messages contained in µ, and not on any messages sent 
during the communication rounds. 
We refer to the K intermediate stages as a K-stage Public Communication
1 I 1 I Procedure, Ck = {M1, ... ,M1, ... ,MK, ... ,MK}.
any K-stage communication procedure C , and 
k 
Given any mechanism µ (M,g)' 
any joint distribution over types, 
F, we call the corresponding K+2 stage game, µ K, a 
to what Farrell 
K-stage public
cormnunication extension of µ. 
communication version of µ.
possibilities in Section 6.
This is similar [1983] calls a 
We discuss more general communication 
Finally, 
** 
let X equal µ 
let x" equalµ 
the set of 
the set of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes to µ and 
all allocations that are Bayesian equilibrium 
outcomes to some K-stage communication game for µ for some K .  We make a point 
of examining Bayesian equilibria instead of sequential equilibria of the 
communication game. The reason is simple . We are interested in proving that 
01_.tr au.gmented games are in1m11ne to cheap talk. Since all sequential equilibria 
are also Bayesian equilibria, if we can show that (essentially) no Bayesian 
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equilibria are added by pre-play communication then we have also shown that no 
sequential equilibria are (essentially) added. 
Since we are investigating the Bayesian equilibria of finite stage public 
communication games, we will restrict attention to the normal form. A 
strategy for agent i in µ is a sequence of functions (ai, ... , ai ) withK 1 K+l 
i Ti-4- Mia 1 1 
i : Ti M -> Mia x 
2 1 2 
i : Ti M M Mia x x ... x -> K 1 K-1 K 
i : Ti M M Mia x x . . . x -> K+l 1 K 
A Bayesian equilibrium is then defined exactly as in Definition 3 .  
** 
We call x the set of Public Communication Equilibria of µ. Observe 
* ** µ * ** * "* 
that x !: x We say that µ is cheap-talk proof if X � x Let V and v µ µ µ µ * µ 11;. 
be the sets of interim utility allocations associated with x and x 
* !!. µ 
respectively. We say that µ is essentially cheap-talk proof v v We areµ µ 
now ready to state the main result of this section. 
Theorem 3 :  Let p be interim efficient. Then it is essentially implementable 
using an essentially cheap-talk proof mechansim. 
Proof : We already know it is essentially implementable using the mechanism µ' 
in Theorem 1. To see that it is essentially cheap-talk proof, suppose not. 
Then, there is a K-stage 
producing an allocation q .  
communication game and an equilibrium; 
Since p is interim efficient, V i (q, t_ ) �
' 
say er, 
i v (p' t ) 
for all i and t and there exists e > 0 such that for some i and some t 
' 
E Tii i V (q,t )<- i 
i i 
v (p ' t . )  € .  Consider the following alternative strategy: si 
player i :  
s k 
' 
ai for all k � Kk 
i sK+1 ( r i
,mK)
aK+l ('Ti'�
) for all mK and all ri
� t
i
sK+1 (ti
,mK) 
(t
i
,</2) for all mK.
for 
This alternative strategy improves i' s interim payoff by at least </2 when i 
is of type t. and does not affect his payoffs at any other type. Hence, a is' 
not an equilibrium. ••• 
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Given a mechanism µ, 
• 
we denote by E the subset of
µ 
• 
interim dominated by any other element of X . µ Similarly, E 
• 
x which is not µ 
""* 
is the set ofµ 
•• 
allocations in X which are not interim dominated by any other element ofµ 
** 
x 
µ 
** 
We call E the public communication frontier of µ. 
µ 
It is the set of
allocations which are achievable as equilibria of some K-stage communication 
extension of µ and which are not interim Pareto dominated by any other public 
communication equilibrium of µ. One can prove, as we do below, that for any 
** 
p E E , there exists an augmentation of µ, say µ', so that p is essentially
µ 
implemented by µ' and µ' is essentially cheap-talk proof. 
This provides a strengthening of Theorem 2 in much the same way as 
Theorem 3 strengthened Theorem 1 .  However, while construction in Theorem 3 
was the same as in Theorem 1, the construction in Theorem 4 is different from 
the construction in Theorem 2. The reason for this is that we are 
implementing different allocations in Theorems 2 and 4. Theorem 2 applies to 
implementation of allocations that are efficient relative to the set of 
equilibrium allocations of a mechanism. Theorem 4 applies to implementations 
of allocations that are efficient relative to the entire set of all public 
communication equilibria of a mechanism. The latter set may include some 
allocations that cannot arise as equilibria of the mechanism alone; they only 
arise if some pre-play communication is added. It is not the case that an 
exact analog of Theorem 2 holds for cheap-talk proof implementation. 
Typically, there may be allocations in E
** 
v.1hich interim Pareto dominate E
'�
., µ µ 
When this is the case, those inferior allocations of µ cannot be essentially 
implemented using an essentially cheap-talk proof mechanism. Furthermore, for 
** * 
those allocations x such that x E E but x <£ E , simply augmenting µ asµ µ 
before will not work. Instead, it is necessary to consider an augmentation of 
a K-stage communication extension of µ, as in the proof of the next theorem. 
Theorem 4 :  Let p E 
implementable using an 
**
** 
E for some µ (M,g) .µ 
essentially cheap-talk proof 
Then p 
mechanism. 
is essentially 
Proof : Since p E E there exists a K-stage public communication extension of
µ 
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(M1, . . .  ,MK,M, g), and an equilibrium to µK, say a, such that
Consider the following augmented mechanism, derived from µ :K 
µ' � (M x [0,1],M , . . .  ,M ,g'), whereK 1 2 K 
g' ((m ,0),m ,. . . ,m ,m) g(m)1 2 K 
pi (m)€ 
where E = (E1, . . .  ,c1), and i is the agent with the lowest index among the set
of agents reporting the smallest positive number, 
exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 2. 
i and p E is constructed in 
It is straightforward to verify that the following is an equilibrium strategy: 
i i i i s1(\) 
� (a1 ( t) ,O) , sk(\,mk_,) � ak(ti,mk_,) for k� 2, . . , K+l, all i and \·* 
and that g(s) � p, implying that p E X  , .µk 
We now demonstrate that the interim utilities from p are the only equilibrium 
interim payoffs in µ' , and that µ' is cheap talk proof .K K 
To see the former, note that no equilibrium to µ' can ever involve a messageK 
at stage one in which some agent reports a positive number . Consequently, 
following exactly the same argument as in the proofs of Theorems 1 -3, no 
equilibriu.Tit can ever yield a payoff �vhich is interim dominated by that from p 
for any i at any t., since this agent should report a small positive number 
i 
and receive approximately the payoff from p. Suppose, then, that there is an 
equilibrium to µ�, say s, which interim dominates the payoff from p. Then, we
* 
claim that s E X µK
To see this, we simply observe that when playing s, no 
agent is ever using a positive number. Thus, when we eliminate the strategies 
which involve using a positive number, i. e. change the game from µ� to µK, s·� '� 
continues to be an equilibrium. This contradicts the fact that p E E 
µ
To prove the latter, consider any L stage public communication extension of 
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µ', say µ�K= (N1, ... ,N1,M1x[O,l],M2, ... ,MK,M,g'). Again, p is an equilibriwn
outcome to µ�K· Noting that no equilibrium to µ�K can involve any agent
reporting a positive number, the same arguments as above imply that no 
equilibrium payoff to µ�K can be interim worse that p. Finally, since 
no equilibrium 
µ, is also anLK * *  
in µ' involves reporting aLK 
equilibrium to µ (definedLK 
positive number, any equilibrium to 
in the obvious way). Therefore, 
p E E implies that no equilibrium to µ' can interim dominate p. BRR µ LK 
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6. Extensions
In Section 5, we only considered public communication. 
results apply to much more general communication structures. 
However, our 
In particular, 
the results can be extended in (at least) three wats. First, we could allow 
Mi to depend previous messages. k Second, we could allow for private
Third, we could incorporate mediated communication between players. 
communication, which would allow for messages to be 11garbled11 or 11filtered." 
These extensions would require more cumbersome notation without changing the 
nature of the arguments in Theorems 3 and 4. 
The assumptions of private values and independence are central to the 
construction employed in the proof of our main results, since they imply that 
the reduced form is incentive compatible. This need not hold with either 
common values i (in which case U depends on t as well as on t ) or in the-i i 
dependent case (where F' (t . ) depends on t.). To see why, consider, for
-i i 
example, the dependent case with transferable utility, so that the 
-i distribution on T given t i 
i P (t_,r.)
and 
i i 
i Y (t , r )  
i i 
is written F' (t . I t.). -i i Let
Now, it is easy to see that in order to maintain incentive compatibility, 
agent i cannot generally be offered reduced form probability and transfer 
functions which depend only on his reported type. Incentive compatibility now 
only says that if, at true type t., i is faced with P' (t_ ,r_) and Y\t. ,r.) if
l. l. 1 1 1 
he reports r
i
, then he will report r
i
= t
i
. It does not say that i will report
truthfully if faced with r' ( r. , r.) and y' ( r .  , r.). What is important, then, is1 l. l. l. 
that the redu_ced form probability functions and transfers deper1d only or1 the 
reported type of the agent and this reduced form be incentive compatible. 
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A similar problem, that of defining the appropriate reduced form, appears 
i with common values, where U depends not only on t but also on t i -i 
there is a large class of cases in which this is possible. 
However, 
This class 
includes the "revision effects" considered by Myerson [1981], and requires the 
utility function to be separable in the following sense. Suppose 
i U (a, t) ¢\a, t .)  
+ 
·if/ ca,t .) .1 -1 
Then, with independent types, essentially the same argument as in Theorem 1 
applies. To see this in the case of transferable utility, let 
Let P\t )i 
and 
Then, 
i 
v (p, t .)  
1 
I I I i i [p (da,dy ,t., t .) R A T - i 1 -1 
+ L11 -i 
Here, we have converted the "common value" part of utility into its monetary 
equivalent. It is easy to show that incentive compatibility implies that the 
reduced form is also incentive compatible. Thus, we can use the same 
augmentation as in the proof of Theorem 1 to essentially implement any interim 
efficient allocation rule. 
Finally, �·re discuss the relationship bet"t·1een our results and the 
literature on full Bayesian implementation .  Let F denote a set of allocation 
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rules. Then, F is fully implementable if there is a mechanism (M,g) such that 
the set of equilibrium outcomes to (M,g) equals F. It is known that in order 
for F to be fully implementable, it must satisfy a condition called Bayesian 
Monotonicity (see Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986], Palfrey and Srivastava 
[1989]). With independent types, this is defined as follows. 
Definition 2: F satisfies Bayesian /1onotonicity if for every collection of 
functions o: { 1 
I} . h i o: , ... ,a wit o: : Ti � Ti, i=l, 2, ... , I, and for every p E F,
if p ff. F then there exists an allocation rule q such i that V (q , t )" i > " i v (p 't ) 
" i 
for some i and t .  and v'( p , t '. ) ;,: Vi ( q, t '. ) for all i and t '. , where
p (t) � p(a(t)) and q (t) " " 
1 1 1 
� q(a (t)) for all t. 
1 
Theorem 1 immediately implies that if p is interim efficient, then the set of 
i i allocation rules defined by F {p" V (pe>
,ti) V (p,ti)l is fully
implementable, and thus satisfies Bayesian Monotonicity. 
verified directly as follows: 
This can also be 
(1) Consider any a such that Vi (p ,t ) < v'(p,t.) - E for some i,t. and some E 0: i 1 1 
> 0. Define the constant allocation rule q (t . , t') � Pi (t ) for all t and 
-i .l. € i -i 
t' where Pi (t ) is constructed in the proof of Theorem 1. Then, q satisfies
i
, 
€ i 
the conditions of Bayesian Monotonocity. 
(2) Consider any " such that v'(p , t ) ;,: v'(p, t .)  for all i and t with strict
0: i 1 1 
inequality somewhere. Then, po: cannot be incentive compatible since p is
interim efficient. Therefore, there must exist i, t and such thati i i V (pa ,ti, r) > V (p",t ,,\ l· Define q(t . , t'.)
i i 
� p (t . ,a (r. ) )  so that q does
-i 1 
not depend on player i's type. Then, Vi(q ,t )" i 
while incentive compatibility of p implies that 
-1 1 
= vi ( p , t , r ) > v1 ( p , t:: ) ,O: i i a 1
v' (p, t'.) ;,: V'(q, t'.) for all1 1 
t' so that q satisfies the conditions of Bayesian Monotonicity. 
i' This 
argument is along the lines of Theorem 4. 4 of Mookherjee and Reichelstein 
[1987]. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem l__;_ 
Given a reduced form allocation rule Pi and a number € > 0, define Pi by : for€ 
all t E Ti, for all (measurable) sets B c A, Cc R, Pi (BxC,t ) � Pi(BxC , t )
i € i € i 
where C � ( z E R€ z+E E 
to Pi in
c}. Thus, Pi (t ) is the reduced form allocation€ i 
rule corresponding 
reduced by e everywhere. 
which the monetary transfers to agent 
I Define the function h : AxR � AxR by
i 
i i i i i i h.(a,y ) (a, -y / (I-1) ,-y / (I-1), ... ,y , -y / (I -1), ... , -y /(I-1))1 
i where y is the i' th component in the range of h . .
1 
Finally, given Pi, define the measure pi (t) E P(AxR1) by€ € 
i 1 I i -1 1 I p .<BxC x ... xc 't) � p «hi (BxC x .. . xc ) 't)
for all measurable sets B � A, i C � R.
i have been 
Note that incentive compatibility implies that truth is an equilibrium in the 
direct game. Consider the game in which the message space of i is Ti x [0, 1].
The outcomes are as follows : 
If, for each i, (t., 0) is reported, the outcome is as under the direct 
1 
mechanism, i.e. p(t). 
If all agents other than i report a zero in the second component of their 
message space while i 
i p ( r , t . ) . (Note that€ i -1. 
deviates from reporting 
reports ( r_ , < ) with e > 0, then the outcome is 
1 ip .< r 
i
, t_i
) does not depend on t_i
). Thus, if i alone
a zero, he gets his reduced form gamble, but pays e 
more. The transfer to i is divided equally among the other agents by the 
construction of the function h .
i 
If more than one agent reports a strictly positive number, then the agent 
reporting the lowest number plays the role of i above. If there is a tie, 
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then the agent with the lowest index and the lowest number plays this role. 
Now, observe that honestly reporting your type and reporting zero is a 
Bayesian equilibrium. This follows from incentive compatibility because for 
any < E (0,1], 
following from 
transfers. 
i i i V (p,t
i
,\) 2': V (p,\,ri
) > V (P,•\•') • the last inequality
the assumption that utility is strictly increasing in the 
Following the same argument as in the case of transferable utility, it is easy 
to see that all equilibria involve reporting zero and that every equilibrium 
yields the same interim utility as p.••• 
Proof of Theorem Z: 
For every measurable set B � A, C � R, define 
i i P (BxC ,m ) J
-i
gi(BxC,mi,a-i(t_i
))dFi(t_)
T 
i i P (BxC, m )
€ 
i 1 I p (BXC X .. . XC ,m) 
€ 
i - 1 1 I i P
,
(h
i 
(BxC x ... XC ) ,m )
for all measurable sets B � A, i C � R. 
and 
We construct µ' from µ as in the proof of Theorem 1. Let the message space of 
each i be Mi x [0,1]. The outcomes are specified as follows.
If no agent reports a positive number, then the outcome is the same as that 
given by g. 
If all agents other than i report a zero 
i 
in the second component of their 
message 
i p (m).
€ 
space while i reports (m ,<) with € 
i -i(Note that p (m) does not depend on m ) . 
€ 
> 0, then the outcome is 
If more than one agent reports a strictly positive number, then the agent 
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reporting the lowest number plays the role of i above. If there is a tie, 
then the agent with the lowest index and the lowest number plays this role . 
Since a is an equilibrium to (M,g), the argument in Theorem 1 showsthat (a,O) 
is an equilibrium to µ' . It is similarly shown that all equilibria to the 
augmented mechanism must yield interim utility equal to that from a.••• 
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